DP1682 | Almost Common Value Auctions: The 'Wallet Game' and its Applications to Takeover Battles and Airwaves Auctions

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31/08/1997

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Abstract

We use a classroom game, the ?Wallet Game?, to show that in standard ascending, i.e. English, auctions of close-to-common-values objects, even slight asymmetries between bidders can have very large effects on prices. Examples of small asymmetries are a small value advantage for one bidder or a small ownership of the object by one bidder; the effects of these asymmetries are greatly exacerbated by entry costs or bidding costs. We discuss applications to airwaves auctions and takeover battles including the Glaxo-Wellcome merger.